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Introduction: the Threat 
 
According to the 4th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, released in 2007, global climate change (GCC) constitutes a grave threat to 
human wellbeing and to the flourishing of earth’s other species. With “high” or “very 
high confidence,” the IPCC predicts the following, regarding the likely effects of GCC 
(all quotes below from IPCC 2007a, pp.48-52): 
 
In Africa, “by 2020, between 75 million and 250 million are projected to be 
exposed to an increase in water stress due to climate change.” 
 
“By 2020, in some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced 
by up to 50%. Agricultural production, including access to food, in many 
African countries is projected to be severely compromised. This would further 
adversely affect food security and exacerbate malnutrition.” 
 
In Asia, “coastal regions, especially heavily-populated mega-deltas in South, 
East, and Southeast Asia, will be at greatest risk due to increased flooding.” 
 
“By the 2050s, freshwater availability in Central, South, East and South-East 
Asia, particularly in large river basins, is projected to decrease.” 
 
According to the IPCC, GCC threatens the health, happiness and even survival of 
literally hundreds of millions of people, through increased risk of malnutrition and 
starvation, and increased frequency of deadly weather events like the 2008 flooding in 
the Irawaddy river delta in Burma. 
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Grave as are these threats to people, the dangers to other species from climate change 
are even greater, since beyond harms to individual organisms, they threaten mass 
extinction. Again according to the IPCC:  
 
In Latin America, “By mid century, increases in temperature and associated 
decreases in soil water are projected to lead to gradual replacement of tropical 
forest by savanna in eastern Amazonia.” 
 
“There is a risk of significant biodiversity loss through species extinction in 
many areas of tropical Latin America.” 
 
In Australia, “significant biodiversity loss is projected to occur by 2020 in 
some ecologically rich sites, including the Great Barrier Reef.” 
 
The Amazon rainforest—the greatest reservoir of biodiversity on earth—is vulnerable 
to wholesale collapse and ecological replacement, while coral reefs around the world—
by far the greatest ocean-based biodiversity sites—are extremely vulnerable to small 
increases in ocean temperatures. GCC thus bids fair to accelerate and ensure the sixth 
great extinction event in earth’s 4.6 billion-year history (and the first to be consciously 
and deliberately caused). Overall, according to the IPCC: 
 
“There is medium confidence that approximately 20-30% of species assessed so 
far are likely
 
 to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average 
warming exceed 1.5-2.5 C (relative to 1980-1999). As global average 
temperature increase exceeds about 3.5 C, model projections suggest significant 
extinctions (40-70% of species assessed) around the globe.” 
A 3.5 C increase in average global temperatures by the end of the century is solidly in 
the middle of projections considered plausible by the IPCC under “business as usual” 
greenhouse gas emissions scenarios. 
 
Dire as the predictions in the 4th Assessment Report were, the scientific literature has 
grown even grimmer in the two and a half years since its publication. Polar ice across 
the Arctic is melting much faster than expected (Wang and Overland 2009). The 
amount of carbon stored in permafrost (and likely to be released as it melts) may be 
much higher than previously estimated (Tarnocai 2009). There may be more warming 
already “banked” into the global climate system than was previously thought. For these 
and other reasons, noted climate scientist James Hansen now argues that humanity must 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions more quickly than previously thought, in order to 
avoid catastrophic climate change (Hansen 2007, Hansen et al. 2008). Many scientists 
agree. 
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The Case for Action 
 
On the factual/empirical side, the 4th IPCC report and subsequent scientific studies 
greatly strengthen the case for action to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Looking at the 
ethics of the matter, arguments for vigorous action to prevent catastrophic GCC appear 
to be over-determined (Singer 2002, chapter 2). For our own sakes, for the sake of the 
world’s poorest people (Brown et al. 2007), for future human generations (Gardiner 
2006) and for the sake of other species, we need to act now to limit and then roll back 
GCC. Attention to any one of these four areas of practical concern should be enough to 
convince us that prudence or justice demand serious action. Together, they make an 
overwhelming case that prudence and
 
 justice make this demand. 
Broadly speaking, then, GCC provides further confirmation of Bryan Norton’s 
“convergence hypothesis”: the theory that biocentric and (enlightened) anthropocentric 
moralities will tend to converge on similar pro-environment policy positions (Norton 
1994). I think the issue also demonstrates a similar convergence between altruistic and 
(enlightened) self-interested concerns (Wenz 2005). Of course, these convergences are 
not perfect. It seems clear that the more biocentric and altruistic we are, the more we 
will be willing to do to check GCC. Such value commitments constitute additional 
reasons for action and additional values to place “on the scale,” balanced against the 
immediate comforts we may be asked to forego or the resources we may be asked to 
contribute in order to limit GCC. 
 
All this granted, however, the key points remain. First, that reining in GCC appears 
necessary to safeguard the flourishing of all life on earth, human and non-human. 
Second, that safeguarding the flourishing of life is a supremely important practical 
imperative. Yet despite this morally and factually compelling case for action, little has 
been done globally to check GCC. Meanwhile the United States—the nation that has 
done the most to create the problem—has not only failed to act, but has worked hard to 
undermine the efforts of other nations to do so. These failures have been due less to 
genuine uncertainty about GCC or real concerns about the fairness of proposed 
emissions reduction schemes (the usual suspects) than because of a largely 
unquestioned belief in the goodness of growth. 
 
 
A Curious Disconnect 
 
There is a disconnect in climate change discourse between discussions of the causes of 
GCC and discussions of possible solutions. The 4th IPCC report makes it clear that 
GCC is caused primarily by human economic and demographic growth. As the 
“Mitigation” report succinctly puts it:  
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“GDP/per capita and population growth were the main drivers of the increase in 
global emissions during the last three decades of the 20th century. … At the 
global scale, declining carbon and energy intensities have been unable to offset 
income effects and population growth and, consequently, carbon emissions have 
risen” (IPCC 2007b, p.107). 
 
Four factors—economic growth/per capita; population (the number of “capitas”); 
energy used per unit of GDP; and greenhouse gases generated per unit of energy—
determine overall greenhouse gas emissions. Over the past three and a half decades, 
improvements in energy and carbon efficiency have been overwhelmed by increases in 
population and wealth. Here are the numbers: “The global average growth rate of CO2 
emissions between 1970 and 2004 of 1.9% per year is the result of the following annual 
growth rates: population 1.6%, GDP/per capita 1.8%, energy-intensity (total primary 
energy supply (TPES) per unit of GDP) –1.2%, and carbon-intensity (CO2 emissions 
per unit of TPES) –0.2%” (IPCC 2007b, p.107). 
 
Crucially, the IPCC’s projections for the next three decades see a continuation of this 
trend. More people living more
 
 affluently mean that despite technical improvements in 
efficiency, greenhouse gas emissions will continue to rise under “business as usual.” 
You might think that a rational response to this might be: “Whoa! We’ve got to cut 
back on human numbers and the pursuit of ever more wealth. We’re bumping up 
against some basic limits here to the system that we all depend on for survival.” Or: 
“Wow! We’ve got our work cut out for us. We need to start working on this problem 
with all
 
 the tools at our disposal. Increasing energy and carbon efficiency, to be sure; 
but also decreasing the pursuit of affluence and overall consumption; and stabilizing or 
reducing the human population.” But no such revaluation of the goodness of growth has 
occurred (Czech 2002). Instead, we have seen a near-total focus on technological 
solutions to the problem by politicians, scientists, and even environmentalists and 
environmental philosophers. 
The problem, the IPCC tells us, is growth. The solution, therefore, would seem to be an 
end to growth. Beyond this, perhaps, an actual reduction in the scale of the human 
economic enterprise might be necessary, or prudent (there is no guarantee that we 
haven’t already overshot the capacity of the world’s atmosphere to assimilate our 
pollution). At a minimum, slowing
 
 growth would seem a likely contributor to serious 
attempts to deal with the problem of GCC. But even this is rarely considered by 
analysts or policymakers. 
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Evasion 
 
Of the many examples I might provide, consider Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow’s 
influential “wedge” approach, first presented in their article “Stabilization Wedges: 
Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies” (2004). 
The wedge approach is a heuristic designed to help people think about the steps needed 
to address GCC and to compare alternatives. If you’ve seen An Inconvenient Truth, 
you’ve seen a version of it; recent research and even a downloadable version of the 
“Carbon Mitigation Wedge Game” can be found at the website for the Carbon 
Mitigation Initiative (www.princeton.edu/~cmi). 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. Stabilization Triangle. Courtesy of the Carbon Mitigation Initiative, Princeton University. 
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Figure 1b. Stabilization Triangle. Courtesy of the Carbon Mitigation Initiative, Princeton University. 
 
 
 
Each wedge in the “stabilization triangle” above represents a technological change or 
(much less frequently) a decrease in consumption which, if fully implemented, would 
keep one billion metric tons of carbon from being pumped into the air annually, fifty 
years from now. It would also prevent 25 billion metric tons of carbon from being 
released during the intervening fifty years. The authors reckon eight such wedges must 
be implemented—not to reduce atmospheric CO2; not to stabilize CO2 levels—but 
simply to keep atmospheric carbon from pushing past potentially catastrophic levels 
during this period. 
 
Here are the fifteen wedges Pacala and Socolow propose as most feasible for reducing 
carbon emissions in a big way: 
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Potential Wedges 
  Option 
Effort by 2054 for one wedge, relative 
to 14 gigatons of carbon per year 
(GtC/year) BAU  
Energy Efficiency 
and Conservation  
  
1. Efficient 
vehicles  
Increase fuel economy for 2 billion cars 
from 30 to 60 mpg  
2. Reduced 
use of vehicles  
Decrease car travel for 2 billion 30-mpg 
cars from 10,000 to 5,000 miles per 
year  
3. Efficient 
buildings  
Cut carbon emissions by one-fourth in 
buildings and appliances projected for 
2054  
4. Efficient 
baseload coal 
plants  
Produce twice today's coal power 
output at 60% efficiency compared 
with 32% efficiency today 
Fuel Shift  5. Gas 
baseload 
power for coal 
baseload 
power  
Replace 1,400 GW coal plants with gas 
plants (4 times the current production 
of gas-based power)  
CO2 Capture and 
Storage (CCS)  
6. Capture 
CO2 at 
baseload 
power plant  
Introduce CCS at 800 GW coal or 1,600 
GW natural gas plants 
7. Capture 
CO2 at 
Hydrogen 
(H2) plant  
Introduce CCS at plants producing 250 
MtH2/year from coal or 500 MtH2/year 
from natural gas,  compared with 40 
MtH2/year today  
8. Capture 
CO2 at coal-
to-synfuels 
plant  
Introduce CCS at synfuels plants 
producing 30 million barrels per day 
from coal (200 times Sasol), capturing 
half of feedstock carbon 
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Nuclear Fission  9. Nuclear 
power for coal 
power  
Add 700 GW nuclear power (twice the 
current capacity)  
Renewable 
Electricity and Fuels  
10. Wind 
power for coal 
power  
Add 2 million 1-MW-peak windmills (50 
times the current capacity) occupying 
30x10-to-the-sixth ha, on land or off 
shore  
11. 
Photovoltaic 
power for coal 
power  
Add 2,000 GW-peak PV (700 times the 
current capacity) on 2x10-to-the-sixth 
ha  
12. Wind H2 in 
fuel-cell car 
for gasoline in 
hybrid  
Add 4 million 1-MW-peak windmills 
(100 times the current capacity)  
13. Biomass 
fuel for fossil 
fuel  
Add 100 times current Brazil or U.S. 
ethanol production, with the use of 
250x10-to-the-sixth ha (1/6 of world 
cropland)  
Forests and 
Agricultural Soils  
14. Reduce 
deforest-
ation, plus 
reforestation 
and new 
plantations  
Halt tropical deforestation instead of 
0.5 GtC/year loss, and establish 300 
Mha of new tree plantations (twice the 
current rate)  
15. 
Conservation 
tillage  
Apply improvements to all world 
cropland (10 times the current usage)  
CCS = carbon capture and storage                   GtC = gigatons of carbon 
GW = gigawatts                                                 ha = hectare 
Mha = million hectare                                       Mpg = miles per gallon 
MW = megawatts                                               PV = photovoltaics 
Figure 2. Courtesy of the Carbon Mitigation Initiative, Princeton University (figure slightly modified) 
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These wedges are worked out in detail in the “supporting online material” to Pacala and 
Socolow (2004). Despite a stated desire to consider only alternatives that are 
technically feasible today, scaling up the carbon capture options (wedges 6-8) would 
rely on future technological improvements that may not pan out (Synapse Energy 
Economics 2008, pp.29-30). While a few of the wedges could pay for themselves over 
time, most, on balance, would involve significant economic costs. Most wedges also 
carry significant environmental costs, which in some cases may equal or outweigh the 
environmental benefits they would provide in helping mitigate GCC. Given problems 
with waste disposal, this is arguably the case with the proposed nuclear wedge, while 
even seemingly benign alternatives such as wind and solar power could result in 
massive habitat loss if pursued on the scale demanded to achieve a full wedge. 
Here is the key point. Of the fifteen wedges proposed by Pacala and Socolow, fourteen 
focus on technological changes in energy and materials production (more solar, more 
nuclear, more natural gas) or improved energy efficiency (increased auto fuel 
efficiency, increased energy efficiency in buildings); one arguably focuses on limiting 
human consumption (cutting the miles driven by automobile drivers); and none of them 
focus on limiting human population growth. 
 
This is hardly a peculiarity of Pacala and Socolow. Most discussions of GCC ignore the 
possibility of limiting consumption or stabilizing population. The goal, always, seems 
to be to accommodate more consumption by more people with less
 
 environmental 
impact. 
Numerous illustrations can be cited from the IPCC 4th Assessment Report itself. For 
example, the report’s authors recognize agriculture as a major contributor to GCC. Yet 
they simply accept projections for greatly increased demands for all categories of 
agricultural products (including a doubling in worldwide demand for meat) and focus 
on changes in tillage, fertilizer use and the like, as means to limit increased greenhouse 
gas emissions (IPCC 2007c). Similarly, the Assessment Report notes that among 
significant greenhouse gas sources, aviation is the fastest-growing sector worldwide. It 
considers numerous changes to aviation practices, including relatively trivial 
improvements in airplane technology and changes in worldwide flight patterns, while 
avoiding the obvious alternative of reducing the number of flights (IPCC 2007d; see 
also IPCC 1999). Many similar examples could be given. 
 
The Reason for this Failure 
 
The failure to consider policies focused on less consumption or smaller populations 
can’t be chalked up to these factors’ unimportance: the scientists assure us that they are 
all-important in generating GCC. Nor is it because there aren’t policies that might 
reduce consumption or slow population growth: there are many policy alternatives in 
these areas. Nor is it because such policies necessarily would be more expensive, harder 
to implement, more coercive, or in any other way less ideal than the technological 
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approaches being considered. Some may be, of course. But there are almost certainly 
consumption and population wedges that could be developed and implemented at less 
economic, environmental and social cost than most of the wedges proposed by Pacala 
and Socolow, and even with considerable overall benefit. 
 
The real problem, I submit, is that the majority of policy-makers and analysts 
considering these matters are in the grip of a pro-growth ideology that makes it 
impossible for them to consider the full range of alternatives. This failure could prove 
disastrous. The evidence strongly suggests that an exclusive focus on technofixes is 
unlikely to prevent catastrophic GCC (Huesemann 2006). Meeting the GCC challenge 
almost certainly depends on ending human population growth and either ending 
economic growth or radically transforming it, so that some economic growth in some 
sectors of the modern economy can be accommodated without radically destabilizing 
earth’s climate. All the technofixes we can muster will probably be necessary to enable 
this transition to a post-growth future—not as an alternative
 
 to it (McKibben 2007). By 
and large, however, policymakers can’t even imagine such a future, much less 
rationally consider whether it might not be required by morality or prudence. 
We need to at least consider alternatives to continued growth. Given the immense costs 
and potential disruptions in attempting to seriously mitigate GCC and given the stakes 
involved in our success or failure, we should consider our full range of options. 
 
Alternative Wedges: Consumption 
 
Consider two potential consumption wedges, focused respectively on food consumption 
and transportation. According to a recent comprehensive study, livestock production 
accounts for nearly 80% of agriculture’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and 
for 18% of all
 
 greenhouse gas emissions today (UNFAO 2006, pp. 112). The 4th 
Assessment Report states that 2004 greenhouse gas emissions were 49 billion tons CO2 
equivalent (IPCC 2007a), 18% of which equals 8.82 billion tons of CO2 equivalent. 
Since one ton of CO2 equals 0.27 tons of carbon, meat-eating contributes 
approximately 2.38 billion tons carbon equivalent to greenhouse gas emissions today. 
Moreover, the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization projects a worldwide doubling 
in animal production between 2000 and 2050, from 60 billion to 120 billion animals 
raised annually (UNFAO 2006), which under “business as usual” will double 
greenhouse gas emissions. According to I.P.C.C. Chairman Rajendra Pachauri, eating 
less meat is one of the most effective things people can do to cut greenhouse gas 
emissions (Scientificblogging 2008). 
How might we carve a “meat wedge” out of this economic sector? Cutting worldwide 
meat-eating in half immediately would provide the equivalent of more than a full 
wedge, but we cannot turn on a dime, as the wedge approach recognizes. More 
realistically, holding worldwide animal food production steady over the next fifty years 
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would provide nearly 2 ½ carbon wedges (2.38 billion tons increase), while merely 
preventing half the projected doubling during that time would supply more than one full 
carbon wedge (1.19 billion tons increase) (Eshel and Martin 2006). The latter goal 
might be accomplished non-coercively by increasing the price of meat, through 
removing subsidies for cattle production, banning confined animal feedlot operations 
(CAFO’s) as the European Union is in process of doing, and directly taxing meat to 
discourage consumption. Such measures could accommodate a reasonable increase in 
meat-eating in poor countries where many people eat little meat, while providing 
environmental and health benefits in wealthy countries where people eat more meat 
than is good for them (Cafaro et al. 2006). They could complement efforts to improve 
the conditions under which food animals are raised, changes which may be expensive 
but which are arguably morally demanded in terms of animal rights or welfare (Rollin 
2006, Compassion in World Farming 2007). 
 
Consider now a transportation consumption wedge. According to the 4th Assessment 
Report, “civil aviation is one of the world’s fastest growing transport means” and the 
fastest-growing important area of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. Analysis shows 
that aviation traffic “is currently growing at 5.9% per year [and] forecasts predict a 
global average annual passenger traffic growth of around 5% – passenger traffic 
doubling in 15 years – with freight traffic growing at a faster rate that passenger traffic, 
although from a smaller base” (IPCC 2007d, p.334). In addition to emitting CO2, 
airplanes increase “radiative forcing” through emissions of other greenhouse gases and 
by creating contrails and cirrus clouds, thus changing atmospheric conditions. Although 
the science remains uncertain, it appears that these contributions to global warming 
may be much greater than airplanes’ CO2 emissions. As an earlier IPCC study put it: 
“Over the period from 1992 to 2050, the overall radiative forcing by aircraft (excluding 
that from changes in cirrus clouds) for all scenarios in this report is a factor of 2 to 4 
larger than the forcing by aircraft carbon dioxide alone” (IPCC 1999, “Summary for 
Policymakers,” Section 4.8). 
 
This scientific uncertainty regarding the full contributions of airplanes to GCC make 
calculating airplane wedges somewhat difficult. However, given the rapid increase in 
airplane flights projected to occur over the next fifty years under business as usual, it 
seems likely that one or two “plane wedges” might be found by instead holding 
airplane travel steady at current rates, or by slowing the rate of increase. Under current 
projections, CO2 emissions from aircraft might increase from 0.2 billion tons of carbon 
per year to 1.2 billion tons of carbon annually, over the next fifty years (IPCC 1999). 
Preventing half this increase would give us half a wedge from CO2 alone, while 
holding total flights at current levels would supply a full wedge (respectively 0.5 billion 
tons or 1.0 billion tons less carbon annually). If the other effects of aviation add up to 
twice the impact of CO2 emissions, preventing half the projected growth would provide 
1 and ½ wedges, while holding total flights at current levels would supply 3 wedges 
(1.5 billion tons or 3 billion tons less carbon equivalent annually). Once again, such 
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reductions could be achieved (relatively) non-coercively, by increasing the cost of air 
travel by taxing it. Alternatively, countries might decide that GCC is important enough 
to demand sacrifices from all their citizens, even rich ones, and limit the number of 
allowable discretionary flights per person. The United States strictly rationed gasoline 
use during World War II; perhaps GCC demands an equally strenuous and across-the-
board response. 
 
The 4th Assessment Report does not consider such demand-reduction alternatives, nor 
do most governments or policy analysts. But recent studies suggest that with efficiency 
improving three times slower than the rate of increased demand and with no 
transformative technologies on the horizon, the air transport sector cannot make a 
sufficient contribution to mitigating GCC without limiting demand for air travel 
(Macintosh and Wallace 2009). Similarly, it seems unlikely that animal agriculture can 
double output without increasing its greenhouse gas emissions. Meanwhile total 
emissions may need to decrease 60% to 80% in the next fifty years in order to avert 
catastrophic GCC and clearly this cannot happen while major economic sectors 
increase
 
 their emissions. Something has to give. It is our choice whether that something 
is ever-increasing consumption, or a safe and nurturing climate for life on earth. The 
good news is that demand reduction is possible, perhaps without significantly 
decreasing people’s quality of life (see below). Other possible wedges include a general 
consumption-reduction wedge utilizing an across-the-board carbon tax, and a luxury 
consumption-reduction wedge targeting unnecessary, energy-intensive, status-driven 
activities by the global elite. 
Alternative Wedges: Population 
 
When we turn to potential population wedges, we need to remember that population 
growth is one of the two main drivers of GCC. Again according to the 4th Assessment 
Report: “The effect on global emissions of the decrease in global energy intensity (-
33%) during 1970 to 2004 has been smaller than the combined effect of global per 
capita income growth (77 %) and global population growth (69%); both drivers of 
increasing energy-related CO2 emissions” (IPCC 2007e, p. 3). 
 
The current global population is approximately 6.8 billion people. Here are recent fifty-
year United Nations population projections at low, medium and high rates of growth:  
 
Projection  annual growth rate  2050   2060 
Low   0.40 %    7.4 billion  8.0 billion 
Medium  0.77 %    8.9 billion  9.6 billion 
High   1.12 %    10.6 billion  11.8 billion 
 
(U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2004, p. 4)  
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The original projections were made to 2050; I projected to 2060 by using the annual 
rates provided. The medium projection is considered the “most likely” scenario, 
although all three projections are considered possible depending on a variety of factors, 
including public policy choices. 
 
How might we calculate population wedges? In 2000, world per capita greenhouse gas 
emissions were 1.84 tons carbon equivalent. Assuming this emissions rate, each 543 
million people added to Earth’s population adds another 1 billion tons of annual carbon 
emissions; conversely, preventing the existence of 543 million people fifty years from 
now provides a full carbon reduction wedge. If we follow the U.N. report and take 9.6 
billion as our “most likely” business as usual scenario, then successfully holding world 
population growth to the lower figure of 8.0 billion would provide 2.95 global 
population wedges. Conversely, allowing the world’s population to balloon to the high 
projection of 11.8 billion (still within the realm of possibility, remember) would create 
4.05 population destabilization wedges and almost certainly doom efforts to mitigate 
catastrophic GCC.1
 
 
These figures suggest that reducing population growth could make a huge contribution 
to mitigating GCC (Meyerson 1998; O’Neill et al. 2005, chapter 6). How might 
humanity accomplish this? One way might be through coercive measures, such as 
China’s “one-child” policy, which restricts how many children couples may have. This 
approach has been condemned on moral grounds, perhaps justly, yet it isn’t clear that 
the freedom to have as many children as one wants is justified in an ever more crowded 
world. As John Stuart Mill put it in On Liberty
 
:  
In a country either over-peopled, or threatened with being so, to produce children, 
beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labour by their 
competition, is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their 
labour. The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the 
parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the 
legitimate powers of the state; and whether such laws be expedient or not, they are not 
objectionable as violations of liberty. (Mill 1966, 138)  
 
                                                          
1 One caveat: most of the population growth projected for the next fifty years is expected to be in 
poorer countries, which have lower-than-average greenhouse gas emissions. This might decrease 
the emissions benefits associated with slowing population growth. However, such lower 
emissions are primarily a function of poverty, which we presumably want to alleviate. Almost all 
attempts to come up with an equitable worldwide division of the effort to mitigate GCC allow for 
some increase in greenhouse gas emissions from the world’s poorest countries. So as we 
calculate population wedges, it seems reasonable to keep world per capita greenhouse gas 
emissions of 1.84 tons carbon equivalent as our “business as usual” default setting. From the 
opposite side, we should also realize that the U.N. figures I’ve used might be somewhat rosy. 
More recently, the U.S. Census Bureau projected that world population will grow from 6 billion 
in 1999 to 9 billion by 2040 (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). 
Essays Philos (2010) 11:1                                                                                                        Cafaro | 57 
 
 
If restrictions on procreative freedom can be justified as a means to maintain wage 
levels, decrease indigence, or promote other social goals, they would appear even more 
justified for the more important global goal of preventing catastrophic GCC, so future 
generations can be assured of inheriting a habitable planet. In any event, it can’t be 
denied that China’s policy has significantly reduced its greenhouse gas emissions. As a 
recent article noted:  
 
China, which rejects criticism that it is doing too little to confront climate change, says 
that its population is now 1.3 billion against 1.6 billion if it had not imposed tough birth 
control measures in the late 1970s . . . Avoiding 300 million births ‘means we averted 
1.3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide in 2005’ based on average world per capital 
emissions of 4.2 tonnes,’ according to Su Wei, China’s lead delegate to the Vienna 
climate talks. (Reuters 2007) 
 
Fortunately, there are non-coercive measures which are almost as effective at reducing 
birth rates, and these are the ones we should pursue. First, providing free birth control 
and accessible, appropriate information about how to use it has proven very effective in 
lowering birth rates in many poor countries (Speidel et al. 2009, pp.3-4). Poor people 
who want to have fewer children often cannot do so, since even relatively cheap birth 
control may be too expensive for them. Providing free birth control allows those who 
want to have fewer children to do so, increasing reproductive freedom while decreasing 
population growth. Second, policies which improve the lives of women have been 
shown to reduce fertility rates in many developing countries (Sen 1994). These include 
guaranteeing girls the same educational opportunities as boys, promoting female 
literacy, and improving women’s economic opportunities (and thus their status in 
society). Some of the very same aims written into the U.N.’s Millenium Development 
Goals—such as improving maternal health and increasing the percentage of children 
receiving a full primary school education—turn out to be among the most effective 
means to reduce birth rates in poor countries (Butler 2007, p. 87). Like providing free 
birth control, these measures can directly improve people’s lives at the same time that 
they help reduce population growth. 
 
Given that these non-coercive methods have proven successful at reducing fertility rates 
in many places and given the huge unmet need for contraception in the developing 
world, a well-funded effort to apply them globally seems capable of reducing 
population growth from the “most likely” scenario of 9.6 billion people to the lower 
level of 8 billion people in 2060. 1.6 billion fewer people fifty years from now 
represents 2.95 carbon reduction wedges. That would make an immense contribution to 
mitigating GCC, nearly equal to deploying all three of Pacala and Socolow’s carbon 
capture and sequestration wedges. Unlike carbon capture, however, the proposed 
population reduction measures rely on proven technologies that are available right now. 
Population wedges would also provide numerous other environmental benefits, in 
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contrast to the massive environmental harms that would be caused by continued coal-
mining under the carbon capture wedges. 
 
Securing women’s rights and furthering women’s opportunities can effectively help 
stabilize human populations. There are plausible win/win scenarios which could aid 
women and their families directly, increasing human happiness and freedom, while 
helping meet the grave danger of GCC (O’Neill 2000, O’Neill et al. 2005). In addition, 
a recent study from the London School of Economics argues that reducing population 
growth is also much cheaper than many other mitigation alternatives under 
consideration (Wire 2009). Given all this, policies to stabilize or reduce populations 
should be an important part of national and international climate change efforts. 
 
Talk of limiting or reducing human numbers makes many people uncomfortable, 
despite the fact that we are not talking about killing people, but preventing births that 
would otherwise occur. Many of us have held a newborn baby and felt a sense of 
infinite possibility and value radiating out from that little form. How could the world 
possibly be better without him or her? It seems an abominable thought. Nevertheless, 
most of us do not have as many children as we are biologically capable of having. 
Resources are limited. People living in many developing nations well understand the 
human
 
 costs of crowding, urban populations that outgrow basic services, and large 
numbers of unemployed young people; meanwhile, even confirmed anthropocentrists 
might well hesitate before accepting the total displacement of wild nature in order to 
maximize human numbers. People are wonderful, but it is possible to have too many 
people: in a family, an apartment, or a nation. GCC may be telling us that it is possible 
to have too many people on the earth itself. Part of its message may be that with 
freedom to reproduce comes responsibility to limit reproduction, so as not to 
overwhelm global ecological services or create a world that is solely a reflection of 
ourselves. 
Fully Considering Our Alternatives 
 
Some of the consumption and population wedges I’ve outlined above might sound far-
fetched. Others might turn out to be unworkable, morally unjustified, or otherwise 
unsound. But if GCC is as serious and intractable a problem as it appears, then perhaps 
they need to be considered. Scientists are telling us that we might have to ratchet down 
emissions faster than we had anticipated in order to avoid catastrophic GCC. If they are 
right, these alternative wedges may become necessary, even if they are unpalatable. 
 
However, some consumption reduction and population stabilization wedges might 
actually be preferable to the usual proposals to deal with GCC. For example, it is not 
clear that doubling or tripling the world’s nuclear reactors is superior to simply cutting 
back on per capita electricity use by reducing unnecessary consumption. Cutting 
consumption might be cheaper and less dangerous. Again, some of us would prefer that 
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our tax dollars go toward helping poor women in developing countries improve their 
lives, rather than subsidizing energy companies’ research and development (and 
profits), as required by Pacala and Socolow’s “clean coal” wedges. Again, limiting 
consumption and population growth seems less selfish and more responsible than 
relying solely on efficiency improvements that pass significant environmental harms on 
to nonhuman beings and future generations, or on futuristic technologies that may or 
may not work. 
 
Whether or not I’m right about any of this, getting a full range of alternatives on the 
table would seem to be our best hope for opening up the debate and finding the fairest 
and most efficient strategies to mitigate GCC.2
 
 The main impediment to doing so 
appears to be an uncritical acceptance of the goodness of growth. 
Human Flourishing and Economic Growth 
 
Earlier, I claimed that GCC is a grave threat to the flourishing of all life, human and 
nonhuman. But there is another way to look at the situation. GCC constitutes a threat to 
human flourishing, but in an important sense GCC is caused
 
 by human flourishing. 
After all, the major cause of GCC is ever more people living ever longer, more secure, 
more luxurious and energy-intensive lives. From this perspective, GCC can be seen as 
yet another example of humanity selfishly monopolizing key natural resources and 
flourishing at the expense of the rest of nature. We are the globe’s kudzu (kudzu is an 
invasive weedy vine in the U.S. Southeast that blankets whole forests, choking out 
other forms of life). 
Just here, a further question becomes crucial: what do we mean by humanity 
“flourishing,” now and in the future? Is it truly a matter of ever more people living ever 
more luxurious lives? Our answer to this question could greatly influence what we are 
willing to do to mitigate GCC. For example, it could determine whether we are willing 
to significantly limit our own consumption to avoid catastrophic GCC; or, from the 
other side, determine whether we accept radical geo-engineering schemes which might 
safeguard humanity at the cost of sacrificing habitat essential to many other species. 
 
                                                          
2 In comparing alternatives, I think we should focus on their overall impact on human and 
nonhuman wellbeing. Such an analysis will also include consideration of the costs, both in 
money and in freedom, of implementing particular wedges. Some of my alternative wedges 
restrict human freedom (limiting airplane flights), while others would increase it (empowering 
women in developing countries). In the end, we might decide that successfully mitigating GCC is 
worth restricting some important human freedoms—since catastrophic GCC will also limit 
human freedom and opportunities in the future. Perhaps, too, in a world with 6.8 billion people, 
many deploying powerful modern technologies, we will have to choose between incompatible 
freedoms. 
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Currently, America’s population stands at 308 million people. Will we be a more 
flourishing nation when we have doubled that to 600 million—as we are on track to do 
in the next fifty or sixty years? Currently, the average American family earns about 
$55,000 per year. Would we be a more flourishing country if household incomes 
averaged $110,000 per year, and we consumed goods and services at the levels that 
such wealth would make possible? 
 
My answer to both these questions is “no.” Doubling America’s population would 
constitute increased flourishing if people flourished like kudzu. But people and the 
nations they constitute are different and can achieve things that matter more than 
reproductive success, or sheer organic bulk. Among these we might rank creating great 
art, literature and music, furthering the progress of science, and sharing the benefits of 
these cultural achievements widely through excellent education for all; raising children 
in loving and nurturing families; engaging in careers that challenge us and provide real 
benefits to society; and treating one another justly, by meeting our moral 
responsibilities to fellow community members and to past and future generations. There 
is little reason to think that such achievements, or anything else of real importance, will 
be furthered by doubling our population.3
 
 
Doubling American’s per capita material wealth might constitute increased flourishing 
if it helped us achieve any of our important goals, or even if it just made us happier. But 
the evidence suggests that it would not. Studies have repeatedly shown that while 
increasing wealth in poor countries does augment happiness, once a society becomes 
sufficiently prosperous, further increases in wealth no longer boost subjective wellbeing 
(Layard 2005, p.22; McKibben 2007, p.35). Throughout the world, the cutoff line 
seems to be around $10,000, far below the average American income. Meanwhile, 
psychological studies show that a materialistic outlook
 
 is actually an impediment to 
individuals achieving happiness (Lane 1998, Kasser 2002, Kasser 2006). This is partly 
because such an outlook interferes with highly valuing people, and good relationships 
with spouses, friends and co-workers turn out to be very important in securing 
happiness. All in all, there is little evidence that doubling our wealth will increase 
Americans’ happiness or flourishing. 
Those are my answers to these questions. Our answers to them may prove crucial to 
GCC policy. Most people in the United States today appear willing to “do something” 
to help mitigate GCC. But as we consider how much to do our calculations will depend 
on how important we consider the economic costs of mitigation. The average person 
                                                          
3 It is true that twice as many people might well generate twice as much artistic creation. But 
without increasing the percentage of works of genius to dross, I would not count this a society-
wide improvement. Again, twice as large a population could provide twice as many scientists and 
thus increase the pace of scientific progress. But since doubling America’s population will lead 
to a tremendous displacement of wild nature, I would not count this an overall improvement 
either. Increased knowledge of an impoverished reality seems a poor trade-off. 
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considering his greenhouse obligations doesn’t seem to get hung up on the 
philosophical complexities of our duties to future generations, common action 
problems, or any of the other issues that philosophers have worked so hard to untangle 
in recent years. Put to the test, he knows that wealthy people shouldn’t harm poor 
people by destroying the ecological services they depend on for their survival. Put to 
the test, he knows that we owe it to our children and grandchildren to leave them a 
better world. Opponents of climate action don’t engage these topics. Instead, they speak 
of the great costs of GCC mitigation, in terms of higher gasoline prices, lost jobs and 
slower economic growth. To the extent proponents can honestly say that taking on 
these economic costs will make a negligible difference to our happiness or flourishing, 
the argument for action is greatly strengthened. Unfortunately, many people have a 
grossly inflated idea of the value of increased wealth to securing happiness, 
particularly, it seems, in the United States. 
 
Enter the Philosophers 
 
Here is one area where philosophical ethicists can greatly strengthen the case for action 
to avert GCC. Philosophers are particularly well-placed to argue for the relative 
unimportance of increased wealth to human flourishing, since we have a tradition, 
reaching back thousands of years, of advocating non-materialistic conceptions of the 
good life. Consider Aristotle, on the proper role of economic activity in a complete 
human life:  
 
With expertise in business there is no limit with respect to the end, [which] is 
wealth and possession of goods. But of expertise in household management 
(oikonomia) as distinguished from expertise in business there is a limit . . . Some 
hold that [business expertise] is [true] expertise in economy (oikonomia), and 
they proceed on the supposition that they should either preserve or increase 
without limit their property or money. The cause of this state is that they are 
serious about living, but not about living well; and since that desire of theirs is 
without limit, they also desire what is productive of unlimited things. (Politics
 
, 
book 1, chapter 9)   
Wealth has real but limited value as a means to human flourishing. Its’ pursuit is not a 
proper end in itself, however, and possessing great wealth should not be confused with 
living well. Our economic activities should be held up against an independent standard 
of human wellbeing. 
 
Similar discussions on the proper roles of wealth, work, consumption and other key 
economic matters are found among all the leading schools of ancient ethical thought 
(East as well as West). Here is Epicurus:  
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Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire. But wealth as defined by 
groundless opinions extends without limit. (Principle Doctrines
 
, maxim XV) 
Becoming accustomed to simple, not extravagant, ways of life makes one 
completely healthy, makes man unhesistant in the face of life’s necessary duties, 
puts us in a better condition for the times of extravagance which occasionally 
come along, and makes us fearless in the face of chance. So when we say that 
pleasure is the goal we do not mean the pleasures of the profligate or the 
pleasures of consumption, as some believe. (“Letter to Menoeceus”) 
 
And here is Seneca, on many issues opposed to Epicurus, but not in this: 
 
In the case of human beings, it is wholly beside the point how much land they 
have under plough, how much money they have invested, how many people pay 
their respects, how expensive are their couches or translucent their cups, but 
how good they are. (“Letters to Lucilius,” letter 79) 
 
Luxury has turned her back on nature, daily urging herself on and growing 
through all the centuries, pressing men’s intelligence into the development of 
the vices. (ibid.) 
 
The life that is happy is in harmony with its own nature. This can only come 
about when the mind is in a healthy state and in permanent possession of its 
own sanity, robust and vigorous, capable of the noblest endurance, responsive 
to circumstances, concerned for the body and all that affects it but not to the 
point of anxiety, conscientious about the other accoutrements of life without 
being too enamored of any one thing, ready to make use of the gifts of fortune 
without being enslaved by them. (letter 90) 
 
Current scholars of Hellenistic ethics tend to skip over such passages (Nussbaum 1994). 
But in their own day, these economic views were seen as central to these philosophies 
(as shown by their prominence and the care with which they were debated) and 
grappling successfully with economic issues was seen as central to living a good life. 
The existence of GCC brings home forcefully the continued relevance of these issues. 
 
The ancients’ general approach to economics was taken up and further developed in the 
medieval Christian philosophical tradition: 
 
External riches are necessary for the good of virtue: since by them we support 
the body, and help others . . . Now, things directed to an end, must take their 
measure from the exigency of the end. Wherefore riches are good forasmuch as 
they serve the use of virtue: and if this measure be exceeded, so that they hinder 
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the practice of virtue, they are no longer to be reckoned as a good but as an 
evil. (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles
 
, chapter CXXXIII) 
Such views gained most of their authority, of course, from the many clear statements on 
the unimportance of wealth and the danger of mammon-worship repeated throughout 
the Gospels. Recently they have supported many religious statements regarding the 
moral imperative to combat GCC, by leaders as diverse as Pope John Paul II and the 
members of the Evangelical Environmental Network (2009). As the Pope put it: 
“Modern society will find no solution to the ecological problem unless it takes a serious 
look at its life style
 
. In many parts of the world society is given to instant gratification 
and consumerism while remaining indifferent to the damage which these cause . . . 
Simplicity, moderation and discipline, as well as a spirit of sacrifice, must become a 
part of everyday life” (John Paul II 1990, section 13, emphasis in the original). 
Similar quotes from the philosophical tradition could be multiplied many times over. 
And when we turn our attention to modern environmental philosophers, we find many 
of the same themes (migrated there, as it were, from a philosophical mainstream which 
had largely lost interest in them). Here is Henry David Thoreau: 
 
When a man is warmed by the several modes which I have described, what does 
he want next? Surely not more warmth of the same kind, as more and richer 
food, larger and more splendid houses, finer and more abundant clothing, more 
numerous incessant and hotter fires, and the like. When he has obtained those 
things which are necessary to life, there is another alternative than to obtain the 
superfluities; and that is, to adventure on life now, his vacation from humbler 
toil having commenced. The soil, it appears, is suited to the seed, for it has sent 
its radicle downward, and it may now send its shot upward also with 
confidence. Why has man rooted himself thus firmly in the earth, but that he 
may rise in the same proportion into the heavens above? (Walden
 
, chapter one) 
There is no more fatal blunderer than he who consumes the greater part of his 
life getting his living. (“Life Without Principle”) 
 
And here is Aldo Leopold:  
 
The ‘key-log’ which must be moved to release the evolutionary process for a 
land ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an 
economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and 
aesthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. (A Sand County Almanac
 
, “The 
Land Ethic”) 
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Nothing could be more salutary at this stage than a little healthy contempt for a 
plethora of material blessings. (A Sand County Almanac
 
, “Foreword”) 
So insistent and consistent have philosophers been in making these points, across 
otherwise differing ethical systems, that they can easily seem to be philosophical 
platitudes. But in the end, do we really have anything more important to say? Perhaps 
GCC is reminding us yet again of the importance of these platitudes. Perhaps it even 
constitutes evidence, on a massive global scale, for their truth. 
 
In any case, coming to understand the real value of all this economic growth that is 
threatening our planet is an important part of the equation as we decide what to do 
about GCC. Since worries about economic costs are the primary impediment to 
effective action on GCC today, philosophers’ efforts here could have real practical 
benefits. 
 
Philosophers can make it easier for people to consider a wider range of alternatives, by 
reminding them of the truth that wealth is not the key to human happiness or flourishing 
(Cafaro 1998). But we should move beyond this and try to specify comprehensive 
alternative visions of flourishing lives and societies, based on the full development of 
our human capabilities, rather than on ever-increasing wealth (Alexander 2009). Here 
we can link up with some very interesting work being done by “positive 
psychologists.”4
 
 Tim Kasser (2002), Ed Diener (Diener and Biswas-Diener 2008) and 
others have marshaled impressive empirical evidence that a materialistic approach to 
life undermines human health and well-being. Philosophers can also make use of the 
writings of ecological economists like Herman Daly, who are working out the details of 
what a sustainable economy might look like (Daly and Cobb 1989, Daly 2007). This 
work shows that there are alternatives to the endless growth economy that is both the 
cause of our problems and (probably disastrously) the background to most proposed 
solutions to them. 
Climate Change Rhetoric 
 
I believe a broadly Aristotelian and Thoreauvian approach, grounded in the value of 
human and non-human flourishing, offers our best hope for ethical guidance, as we 
search for ways to move beyond endless growth and successfully mitigate GCC. This 
will necessarily involve both individuals and societies putting economics in its proper 
place. But doing so will not be easy, particularly here in America, where economic 
growth comes close to being a sacred value. Consider the rhetoric around popular 
efforts to encourage action on GCC. 
 
                                                          
4 Positive psychology focuses on fully specifying and promoting human well-being, in contrast to 
mainstream psychology’s primary focus on specifying and curing mental illness. 
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Mass initiatives like Focus the Nation and Al Gore’s Wecansolveit.org are morally 
earnest, yet optimistic. They emphasize that the GCC challenge is manageable and can 
be met without drastically harming standards of living. In fact, they claim, GCC is 
chock full of economic opportunities. In a section on their website proposing 
“Solutions” for a “Clean Energy Economy,” Wecansolveit.org exclaims: “Thousands of 
new companies, millions of new jobs, and billions in revenue generated by solutions to 
the climate crisis—this is the clean energy economy we can adopt with today's 
technologies, resources, know-how, and leadership from our elected officials.” 
Furthermore: “A recent report showed that investment in a clean and efficient economy 
would lead to over 3 million new green-collar jobs, stimulate $1.4 trillion in new GDP, 
add billions in personal income and retail sales, produce $284 billion in net energy 
savings, all while generating sufficient returns to the U.S. treasury to pay for itself over 
ten years." They conclude: “This is the opportunity of our generation—to lead the 
transformation to an economy that is robust without causing environmental harm.” 
 
There are good practical reasons to be optimistic in tone and emphasize the economic 
positives in talking to our fellow citizens. If the only way for Americans to do our part 
to stop GCC is to give up our cars or keep our houses heated to 55 degrees during the 
winter, I don’t think we’ll make the effort. Fortunately, Al Gore and other optimists are 
right that many of the steps needed to limit greenhouse gas emissions will save us 
money and that the new energy technologies we need to develop and deploy can be 
growth industries for the U.S. economy. Estimates that the world might meet the global 
climate challenge by devoting only 2% of world GDP to the effort really do give 
grounds for optimism (Stern 2005) 
 
Above all, the “positive” approach recommends itself because it has led to some 
successes. For example, in my home state of Colorado, we have—through a direct 
citizens’ referendum and subsequent government action—committed the state to 
billions of dollars of new investments in alternative energy in the next decade. We 
didn’t achieve this by hanging crepe, but by combining moral exhortation with 
optimism. “Global warming is our generation’s greatest environmental challenge,” 
states Governor Bill Ritter, in his introduction to the Colorado Climate Action Plan
 
. 
“Can Coloradans really make a difference? I believe we can, and that we have a moral 
obligation to try.” “[Our] success depends on everyone doing his or her part. We can 
reduce global warming and keep our economy strong and vibrant. This is an exciting 
time for Colorado as we look toward an expanded New Energy Economy with new 
jobs, new businesses and new investments” (Ritter 2007, p.2). Colorado’s plan is one of 
the most far-reaching alternative energy mandates in the United States. Score a point 
for the power of positive thinking. 
However, this approach engenders two worries. First, it might not be able to support all 
the measures needed to adequately address the problem. What happens when mitigating 
GCC doesn’t save us money or contribute to growth, but instead costs us money and 
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inhibits growth? Second, this approach’s boosterism might further solidify the 
economic paradigm that is causing GCC and the rest of our environmental problems in 
the first place, and further entrench the economic mindset which makes it so difficult to 
solve them. Can we really “expand” our economies and keep them “vibrant and strong” 
(i.e., growing even more) while also “reducing global warming”? Can an economy 
really be “robust [that is, rapidly growing] without causing environmental harm”? 
 
The evidence suggests not. Hence we need to learn the most important economic lesson 
GCC has to teach us: that the endless growth economy is unsustainable and must be 
replaced by a fundamentally different alternative. 
 
Climate Change Reality 
 
What is GCC? We are cooking the Earth, radically destabilizing the climate of the only 
home we or our descendants will have (at least for the foreseeable future). We are 
doing this at great risk to ourselves and great cost to the other species with whom we 
share this planet. 
 
How are we creating GCC? Not by accident, now, but consciously, as a byproduct of 
ever more human economic activity. 
 
Why are we creating GCC? Because we believe—or act as though we believe—that 
ever more economic activity is the key to living good human lives. Or because we 
believe that there is no real alternative to ever more economic activity: that it is either 
as inevitable as Newton’s laws of motion, or that the alternatives are so dismal that we 
could never accept them. So, in responding to GCC, the assumption so far has been that 
we can continue to have growing economies while generating less greenhouse gas 
emissions, as long as we make some (perhaps difficult and costly) technological and 
managerial changes. But this assumption is becoming less plausible with each year’s 
reports of melting tundra and receding glaciers. 
 
In the short term, we might make impressive strides in lowering the greenhouse gas 
emissions of various human activities (driving, providing electricity for our homes, 
etc). But there are also limits to how far we can push down these emissions: technical 
limits, economic limits, physical limits, and the limits associated with human inertia. 
Meanwhile, all else being equal, more people equal more greenhouse gas emissions and 
wealthier people mean more greenhouse emissions. The “Environmental Kuznets 
Curve”—whereby societies, once they become sufficiently rich, start to “purchase” 
increased environmental protection and clean up their messes—is a very comforting 
idea, which apparently does not hold for GCC (Stern 2004). So, under the endless 
growth status quo, all our economic successes make mitigating GCC more difficult. 
 
Essays Philos (2010) 11:1                                                                                                        Cafaro | 67 
 
 
In the long term, it seems clear that an ever-growing economy—with more people 
consuming more, producing more goods and services per capita, and generating ever 
more wealth—will sooner or later lead to dangerous GCC. Unless you imagine a way 
of life that creates no
 
 greenhouse gas emissions per capita, you have to accept that at 
some point continued growth in population, consumption and production will generate 
dangerous greenhouse gas emissions and catastrophic GCC. 
Imagine a benign, post-fossil fuel economy, where people generate no greenhouse 
gases at all. Even in this advanced state, shouldn’t we assume that an endlessly growing 
human economy will create other strains on basic ecosystem services? No one 
anticipated stratospheric ozone depletion as a byproduct of the growing world 
economy; almost no one anticipated GCC. One of the main lessons of GCC should be 
that we are likely not at the end of this career of unanticipated consequences. According 
to the recent Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, currently fifteen of twenty-four key 
global ecosystem services are being degraded or used unsustainably (Reid et al. 2005). 
GCC is not the only area where humanity is pushing up against global ecological limits. 
 
Imagine, furthermore, that we can continue to grow indefinitely and somehow avoid 
eco-catastrophes like ozone depletion and GCC. Even then, ever more people 
consuming and producing ever more stuff will certainly demand the continued taming 
of the earth and the continued displacement of nonhuman species. Some of us rank 
these environmental trends right up with GCC as environmental and moral disasters 
(Crist 2007). Many proposed responses to GCC, from seeding the oceans with iron to 
covering the earth with solar collectors to floating vast armadas of balloons up into the 
stratosphere, would move humanity further toward a bland technological utopia in 
which we press every acre of land (and even the depths of the seas and the heights of 
the atmosphere) into service to our vast needs, turning the earth into an artificially-
controlled human life-support system, while totally displacing wild nature. This would 
constitute a monstrous injustice toward the rest of life on earth—and a dangerous bet on 
our own foresight and technological abilities. 
 
What all this suggests is that sooner or later (and in any case not all that much later) we 
are going to have to shift out of the endless growth economic paradigm if we hope to 
avoid the worst of GCC, meet our other environmental challenges and act prudently 
and morally as a species. But the political path to doing so is not clear. 
 
A Conundrum 
 
At the heart of mitigating GCC there is a conundrum common to many environmental 
issues. If environmentalists call for what we believe is needed to fully meet a problem, 
we often put ourselves outside the mainstream of society, which believes in the 
goodness or inevitability of continued economic growth. It can be hard to get a hearing 
for our proposals, from politicians or the general public, and we risk irrelevancy and 
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failure. On the other hand, if we accept continued economic growth and make our 
policy suggestions within this framework, we often cannot propose solutions that might 
really solve the problems we’re worried about. Again, we risk irrelevancy and failure. 
Furthermore, by accepting the “growth is good” framework we legitimize it and ensure 
a steady stream of future environmental problems. 
 
What makes this problem so difficult is that it is not just a matter of taking the blinders 
off our eyes and heroically challenging “growth is good.” In order to do good work, 
environmentalists often have to put aside our scruples and work within the dominant 
paradigm. For example, some of us in northern Colorado are working to prevent a new 
reservoir that would dry up the river that flows through Fort Collins. In order to 
maximize our chances of killing this project, we decided early on to get with the 
program. “Of course,” we say in our public presentations: “this area is going to grow. 
People will need more water. But we can provide all the water we need, if we 
implement serious water conservation efforts and some innovative supply solutions. 
Not only that, but it will be much less costly to water ratepayers in affected 
communities.” I think that this approach has been more effective in convincing the 
general public and local politicians to stand with us than an approach challenging 
growth would have been. And when we comment formally to government regulators, or 
sue the project’s promoters in federal court, we have to accept that a certain amount of 
projected growth is a valid reason for developing water projects. Our only hope of 
winning over regulators, or winning at law, is to argue that this growth can be met in 
other ways. A similar dynamic comes into play when area environmentalists try to 
influence state transportation policies, sway local planning and zoning decisions, or run 
for public office. Get labeled a “no growther” and you lose your place at the table.5
 
 
For these reasons, I can’t fault Governor Ritter for playing up the economic benefits of 
“the new energy economy” as a way to sell voters on doubling Colorado’s renewable 
energy mandate, or blame Wecansolveit.org for accentuating the positive in promoting 
similar steps at the national level. Such efforts are part of the difficult, long-term 
objective of “turning the ship” in a more sustainable direction. If environmentalists 
want to be involved in politics, we will often have to make concessions toward this 
“smart growth” model. 
 
On the other hand, when we ignore the role of growth in creating our environmental 
problems, we pass up opportunities to challenge endless growthism: challenges which, 
even if they didn’t work in particular cases, would help get the idea of limits to growth 
out in the culture. Instead, our environmental debates often perversely run the “growth 
is good, growth is inevitable” ruts even deeper. 
                                                          
5 Chances are that your town and state are similar. It may be possible to get elected to 
California’s Marin County Commission as a “no growther,” just as it’s possible to get elected a 
Socialist Senator from Vermont. But these are the exceptions. 
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On the other hand, accepting endless growth perpetuates Americans’ childishness, 
which seems to be at the root of our inability to solve many of our environmental (and 
other) problems.6
 
 Childhood is and should be a time of rapid physical growth and often 
thoughtless exuberance. Adulthood is the time when such physical growth ends and we 
take on adult responsibilities (while hopefully continuing to grow in other ways). 
On the other hand and most basically, accepting endless growth ensures continued 
environmental deterioration
 
. It ensures that we will lose, long-term. The rivers will be 
dammed, the farmlands will be paved over, wild species will retreat from the landscape, 
greenhouse gas emissions will continue to increase and temperatures will continue to 
rise. Environmentalists are sometimes urged to take the long view and think “seven 
generations” out into the future. Projecting current economic and population growth 
rates out two hundred years presents a truly dismal picture. 
Conclusion 
 
What is to be done? I think the answer must involve tactical acceptance of “growth is 
good” in particular political contexts, but a firm strategic rejection of “growth is good” 
in our ethical philosophies and overall environmental goals. Just here is where GCC 
most challenges us to rethink ethical fundamentals (Jamieson 1992, pp.290-292). 
Philosophers should take the lead in exposing the fallacy that economic growth is any 
longer the key to human flourishing in wealthy industrial democracies. We should 
emphasize the need to pursue intellectual/spiritual/personal/relationship growth rather 
than
 
 increased wealth, if we hope to live better lives. Environmental philosophers 
should also deal honestly with population issues, something we have rarely done in the 
recent past (Hardin 1993). At a minimum, we should acknowledge the role population 
growth plays in environmental destruction, rather than continuing to sweep this 
unpleasant fact under the rug. 
We also need to begin to bring “growth is bad” into politics, as well. It is difficult to see 
how this might be accomplished, however, at least from an American vantage point. 
For Americans, economic growth is not one goal among many, or a by-product of some 
more fundamental goal. It is the primary goal of our society, organizing much of our 
activity, individually and collectively. Every major-party candidate for President, for at 
least the past eighty years, has run on a pro-economic growth platform. Every major-
party candidate for Congress in 2008 did likewise. One hundred and sixty three billion 
dollars in advertising were directed at the American public in 2006—almost half the 
                                                          
6 When I read an article about Denmark’s or Norway’s enlightened environmental policies, I 
often wonder: “How come they can do that?” And usually wind up answering: “Oh that’s right, 
they’re grown-ups.” 
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total world advertising budget—in order to keep Americans consuming at high levels 
(World Advertising Research Center 2007).  
 
In the face of this vast system in the service of economic growth, environmentalism is a 
puny force indeed. The wonder is not that it has accomplished so little, but that it has 
accomplished anything at all. Nevertheless, it is better to face reality, since, as GCC 
suggests, we will be forced to do so sooner or later. In order for environmentalists to 
win our important battles, including  
preventing catastrophic GCC, we must end the endless growth economy.7
                                                          
7 Thanks to Ron Sandler, Katie McShane, Elijah Weber, Allen Thompson, Jeremy Bendik-
Keymer and an anonymous reviewer (who is Martin Schönfeld—the ed.) for Essays in 
Philosophy, for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to probing questions from 
audiences at Colorado State University, the University of Georgia and Clemson University’s 
conference on “Human Flourishing and Restoration in the Age of Global Warming.” Finally 
thanks to John Calderazzo and SueEllen Campbell for pushing me to begin exploring the ethics 
of global climate change, as part of the first “Focus the Nation” teach-in at Colorado State 
University. This paper is dedicated to them in friendship and gratitude. 
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